Let. 25. Lord BoLINGBROKE. 11

elſewhere obſerves, all the phænomena, from our birth to our death, ſeem repugnant to the immateriality and immortality of the ſoul. But all that theſe phænomena prove, is not that body and ſoul are one and the ſame ſubſtance, but that there is a cloſe union between them, which there may be, and yet they may be ſubſtances of very different natures; and that they really are ſo appears, as has been already ſhewn, from their different eſſential properties. The laws of this union were ap- pointed by the author of the human frame; and by virtue of thoſe laws ſoul and body have a mutual influence upon one an- other whilſt that union ſubſiſts. But it by no means follows that when this union is diſſolved, both theſe ſubſtancés, ſo dif- ferent from one another, do alike fall into the duſt. Nor can this be concluded from the phænomena.— We ſee indeed what becomes of the fleſhly corruptible body, but we canot pretend to decide that therefore the thinking immaterial ſubſtance is diſ- ſolved too, or to determine what becomes of it.

But he urgeth, that“ though thinking and unthinking ſub- ſtances ſfhould be ſuppoſed never ſo diſtinct from one an- other, yet as aſſumed ſouls were given to inform bodies, both are neceſſary to complete the human ſyſtem; and that neither of them could exiſt or act in a ſtate of total ſepara- tion from the other“.“ And he obſerves, that Mr. Wollaſton is ſo ſenſible of this, that he ſuppoſes that there is beſides the body which periſhes, ſome fine vehicle that dwells with the ſoul in the brain, and goes off with it at death. Our author has not offered any thing to ſhew the abſurdity of this ſup- poſition, except by calling ſuch a vehicle the ſbirt f the ſoul, and talking of the ſoul's Hying away in its ſbirt into the oßen Feelds f heaven: which may, for aught I know, paſs with ſome perſons for witty banter; but has no argument in it. Very able philoſophers, both antient and modern, have ſup- poſed, that all created ſpirits are attended with material vehi- cles. But whatever becomes of this ſuppoſition with regard to the human ſoul, I do not ſee how it follows that a ſubſtance which is eſſentially active, intellective, and volitive, ſhould loſe all intellect, action, and volition, merely on its being ſeparated from a material ſubſtance to which it was united, and which is naturaily void of theſe qualities. However it might be bound by the laws of that union for a time, there is no reaſon to think it fhould be ſtill ſubject to thoſe laws, and that it ſhould be unable to act or think at all, after this union is diſſolved.

u Vol. iii, p. 517.) he