10 A View ef ibe DEis ricaL Writers. Let. 29.

ligences and conſciouſneſſes, which could not be one and the ſame individual intelligence and conſciouſneſs. Matter there- fore is not a ſubject capable of an individual conſciouſneſs, which conſequently muſt have ſome other ſubject to reſide in. This argument is purſued with admirable clearneſs and force by the learned Dr. Clarbke in his letter to Mr. Dodwell, and in his ſeveral defences of it againſt Mr. Collins, who puſhed the argument for the materiality of the ſoul as far as it could bear. Nor do I find that Lord Bolingbroke hath advanced any thing that can be called new upon this ſubject. He ſuppoſes but does not prove all the ſpecies of intellectual beings to be ma- terial, and talks of an intelleczual ſpring common to them all; which, he ſays, is the ſame ſpring in all, but differently tem- pered, ſo as to have different degrees of force and elaſticity in ſome from Wwhat it has in others; and he reſolves the ſurpriz- ing variety of its effects into the apparent difference in the conſtitutions or organizations of animals“. But it is juſtly argued on the other hand, that it is abſurd to ſuppoſe, that that which is unintelligent and inſenſible before organization, can become intelligent and ſelf-conſcious by organization, ſinc organization does not alter the nature and eſſence of things. Theſe obſervations ſeem to me ſufficient to take off the force of what Lord Bolingbroke hath advanced, to ſhew that the ſoul is not an immaterial ſubſtance diſtinct from the body.— His view in it is plain; it is to deſtroy the proof of its immortality, and to bring in this concluſion, that ſince it is not a diſtinct fiubſtance from the body, it muſt die with it. He pretends indeed that the opinion of the ſoul's immateriality adds no ſtrength to that of its immortality; and blames the metaphy- ſical divines for clogging the belief of he immortality of the ſoul with that of its immateriality; and that by reſting toο much on the latter they weaken the formers. But the true reaſon of his finding fault with it is, that the immateriality of the human ſoul furniſheth a ſtrong preſumption in favour of its immortality, or at leaſt that it may furvive when the body is diſfolved. That he himſelt is ſenſible of this, appears from what he acknowleges, that“on fuppoſition of the ſoul's being ccha different ſubltance from matter, philoſophers argue ad- ²« mirably well a Briori, and prove with great plaulibility, **that this mind, this ſoul, this ſpirit is not material, and «« is immortal.“ He urges indeed, that“ this aſſumption cau- „t not ſtand an examination aà Soferiori*;“ that is, as he