Let. 25. Lord BorrNcoRRORL. 9

certainly above“ the power of motion and of figure, according «« to all the ideas we have of them; and therefore, ſaith he, 1 embrace very readily the opinion of thoſe who aſſume, that *God has been pleaſed to ſuperadd to ſeveral ſyſtems of mat- ter, in ſuch proportions as his infinite wiſdom has thought *e fit, the power of thinking?.“ This is an hypotheſis he ſcems fond of; he frequently refers to it, and ſays it is little leſs than blaſphemy to deny ita. Mr. Locke, as he obſerves, ſuppoſed, that God might if he pleaſed, give to certain ſyſtems of created ſenſeleſs matter, put together as he thinks fit, ſome degree of ſenſe, perception, and thought. But what Mr. Locke had advanced as barely poſſible, for aught he knew, to al- mighty power, our author aſſumes as having been actually done, and as continually done in the ordinary courſe of things. But I think we may ſafely leave it to any unprejudiced judg- ment, whether it be not more reaſonable and more philoſophi- cal, to aſſgn different ſubſtances as the ſubjects of properties ſo intirely different, than to fuppoſe properties merely ſuper- added by Omnipotency to ſubſtances to which they do not naturally belong? Why ſhould Lord Bolingbroke have been ſo backward to acknowlege a diſtinct ſubſtance from matter as the ſubject of theſe properties, when he himſelf was obliged to acknowlege, that the idea of thought is not included in the idea of matter, and that intellect is above the Bower&f mo- tion and figure according to all the ideas we hadve of them 5 Is it agreeable to the divine wiſdom, or to the order of things, to ſuppoſe that God, in the general courſe of his providence, continually ſuperadds preternatural or ſupernatural properties and powers to things not naturally fitted to receive them, ra- ther than that he hath produced ſpiritual ſubſtances, to which by the original conſtitution of their natures theſe properties and powers do belong? It hath been often ſhewn by thoſe that have treated this ſubject, that the eſſential properties of body and ſpirit are not only diſtinet, but incompatible, and that therefore they cannot belong to the ſame ſubſtance, but muſt be the properties of different ſubſtances. Matter being a ſolid, figurable, diviſible ſubſtance, conſiſting always of ſeparable nay of actually ſeparate and diſtinct parts, it is evident from the very nature of it that it is not one indiviſible ſubſtance, but is compounded of innumerable little ſubſtances, which are really diſtinct, though contiguous; ſo that if the intelligent ſubſtance in us were corporeal, it would be a compound of many intel-

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pĩ Vol. v. p. 35. 2 Vol. iii. p. 364. ligences