8 A View of the DEisr IcAE Writers. Let. 25.

aſſerts, that we have clear ideas of the primary properties belonging to body, which are ſolidity and extenſion, but that we have not a poſitive idea of any one primary property of ſpirit. And the only proof he brings for this is, that actual thought is not the eſſence of ſpirit; but if inſtead of actual thought being the eſſence of the ſoul, the faculty of thinking be ſuppoſed to be one of its primary eſſential qualities or pro- perties, this is what we have as clear an idea of as we have of iolidity and extenſion h. He himſelf elſewhere obſerves, that „e our ideas of refiection are as clear and diſtinét as thoſe of ſenſation, and convey knowlege that may be ſaid to be more ¹* reali.“ And that„the ideas we have of thought by re- flection, and of ſome few modes of thinking, are as clear has thoſe we have of extenſion, and the modes of extenſion by fenſation k.“ Why then may we not from thoſe ideas infer a thinking, as well as from the other a ſolid extended ſubſtance? And that theſe ſubſtances are abſolutely diſtinct, and of different natures, ſince their properties manifeſtly are ſo? He hath himielf acknowleged enough to ſhew the reaſon- ableneſs of this concluſion. That we live, and move, and «think,“ faith he,“ and that there muſt be ſomething in the «* conſtitution of our ſyſtem of being, beyond the known pro- *„¹ perties of matter, to produce ſuch phænomena as theſe, are undeniable truths.“ He adds indeed,““What that ſome- thing is, we know not; and ſurely it is high time we ſhould «« be convinced, that we cannot know itl.“ But though we cannot deſcribe its intimate eſfence, we may know enough of it to be convinced, that it is not matter. It is to no purpoſe to pretend, that there may be unknown properties of matter, by which it may be rendered capable of thinking. For the properties of matter that we do know are inconſiſtent with the power of ſelf-motion and conſciouſneſs. It is true, that he cenſures thoſe as proud dogmatiſts, who beſtow the epithets of inert, ſenſelefs, ſtupid, paſſive, upon matter. But in his calmer mood, when he is not carried away by the ſpirit of op- poſition, and has not his hypotheſfis in view, he owns, that ¹« matter is purely pafſive, and can act no otherwiſe than it is *acted uponn.“ It is therefore inconſiſtent with its nature to aſcribe to it a principle of ſelf-motion.

He expreſly acknowleges, that“our idea of thought is not «« included in the idea of matter“.“ And that intellect is

a Val. iii. P. F1O, FI 1, 5 12. 1 Ibid. p. 365. k Ibid. p. 4²⁷. 1 Ibid. p. 5 9. m Ibid. p. 25. n Vol. v. p. 472. ² Vol. iii. p. 364.

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certainly