— Lord BoL INGBROKV. 7

«« Being is a ſyſtem of matter⸗.“ He ſays indeed, that“ of ** any acber ſpirit we neither have nor can have any know- 5 lege:“ And that all ſpirits are hypothetical, but the In- *« finite Spirit, the Father of Spirits b.“ But if there are other beings whoſe eſſential properties are inconſiſtent with the known properties of matter, and particularly if our own ſouls are ſo, and if abſurd conſequences would follow from the ſuppofing them to be material beings, may it not be rea- fopably argued, that they are fubſtances 9 a different kind from what we call matter or body? The only way we have, by his own acknowlegement, of knowing different ſubſtances is by their different qualities or properties. He obſerves, that

*⁴ ſenſitive knowlege is nos ſufficient to know the inward con- «« ſtitution of ſubſtances, and their real eſſence, but is ſuffi- ℳ

cient to proxe to us their exiſtence, and to diſtinguiſ them «« by their effectse:“ And that“ the complex idea we have of eve ery ſubſtance is nothing more than a combination of «« ſeveral ſenſible ideas, which determine the apparent nature of it to us.“ He declares that“ he cannot conceive a ſub- ſtance otherwiſe than relatively to its modes, as ſomething in which thoſe modes ſubſiſtd.“ And blames the philoſo- phers for“ talking of matter and ſpirit as if they had a per- ** fect idea of both, when in truth th ey knew nothing of either but a few lir enomena inſufficient to fracnc an ay h) Ypot theſis e.“

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Tet he himſelf ſpeaks of material ſubſtance, as a thing““ we

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perfectly W eeaun are affured of, whilſt we only aſſume or gueſs at ſpi ritual or immateria! ſub ſtance f.“ But we have as much reaſon to be aſſured of the latter as of the former, ſince in neither caſe the ſubſtance or eſſence itſelf is the objeé of our ſenſe, but we certainly infer it from the properties, which we know in the one caſe as well as in the other. He does not pretend to deny that the exiſtence of ſpiritual ſub-

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e is poſfibles. Why then ſhould not he allow their tual exiſtence, ſince there are properties or qualities, from aich it may reaſonably be inferred, that they actually Xiſt? He finds great fault with Mr. Locke for endeavouring to ſhew that the notion of ſpirit involves no more difficulty or obſcurity in it than that of body, and that we Ln no more of ſolid than we do of the thinking ſubſtance, nor how we are extended than how we think. In oppoſition to this he

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a Vol. iii. p. 321. 503 b Ibid. p. 32 4 Ibid. p. 524. e Ibid p. 509, 510 s Ibid. p. 509.