6 A Vieao of tbe DEæisrTicAL Wrilers. Let. 25.

*¹ have either done it to exerciſe their wit, or have been tranſ- *¹ ported by overheated imaginations into a philoſophical deli- *rium?*.“ He pronounces, that for philoſophers to main- tain that the ſoul is an immaterial being, is as if they fhould agree“ that twice two makes fivey.“ And though in a paſ- ſage cited before, he introduces a plain man ſaying, that as he could not affirm, ſo he would not deny a future ſtate, yet he makes him declare that“ revelation apart, all the phænomena *„ from our birth to our death ſeem repugnant to the imma-

4* teriality and immortality of the ſoul; ſo that he is forced *⁴ to conclude with Lucretius,

Gigni Bariter cum corßorè, et una Creſcere ſentinus, Pariterque ſeneſcere mentem.

That“ God had given him reaſon to diſtinguiſh and judge, and **external and internal ſenſe, by which to perceive and reflect; but that this very reaſon ſhewed him the abſurdity of em- bracing an opinion concerning body and mind, which nei- ther of theſe ſenſes ſupporis ².“

I believe you will be of opininon, upon conſidering what has been now produced, that Lord Bolingbroke has left us little room to doubt of his real ſentiments in this matter. I fhall now examine whether he has offered any thing that is of force fufficient to invalidate a doctrine, the belief of which he himſelf acknowleges to be of great uſe to mankind.

As to that which lies at the foundation of his ſcheme, viz. his denying that the ſoul is a ſpiritual or immaterial ſubſtance diſtinet from the body, I do not find that he has produced any thing which can be called a proof that ſuch a ſuppoſition is unreaſonable. He indeed inveighs againſt metaphyſicians and divines for talking about ſpiritual and immaterial eſſences and ſubſtances: He charges them with fantaſtical ideas, and a Sneumatical madhneſt. But ſuch invectives, which he repeats on all occaſions, will hardly paſs for arguments. 4

He doth not pretend to ſay, as ſome have done, that ſpiri- tual or immaterial ſubſtance implies a contradiction. He blames Sbino a for maintaining that there is but one ſubſtance, that is matter; and aſſerts,“though we do not know the manner of * God's being, yet we acknowlege him to be immaterial, be- ¹*cauſe a thouſand abſurdities, and fuch as imply the ſtrongeſt “˙¹contradiction, reſult from the ſuppoſition, that the Supreme

x Vol. iii. p. 379. y Ibid. p. 535. 2 Ibd.p. Sleg 6 e1