Let. 25. Lord BoLINGBROKE. 5

Eſſay concerning the nature, extent, and reality human knou- lege, which takes up near one haltf of the third volume of his works; eſpecially in the firſt, eighth, and ninth ſections of that eſſay. Heè expreſly aſſerts,“ that there is not any thing, phi- 4 loſophically ſpeaking, which obliges us to conclude, that we « are compounded of material and immaterial ſubſtance?:** That“immaterial ſpirits, conſidered as diſtinct ſubſtances, «„ are in truth the creatures of metaphyſics and theology 4:“ That human pride was indulged by heathen philoſophers ««and Platonic Chriſtians; and fince they could not make man *participant of the divine nature by his body, they thought *« fit to add a diſtinct ſpiritual to his corporeal ſubſtance, and *«to afſfume him to be a compound of bothr:““ And that ¹e the notions that prevail about ſoul, ſpiritual ſubſtance, and *e ſpiritual operations and things, took their riſe in ſchools, «where ſuch doctrines were taught as men would be ſent to ¹ Bedlam for teaching at this days.“ He has a long marginal note, Vol. iii. p. 514, et /eg. which is particularly deſigned to anſwer Mr. Wollaſton's arguments for the immortality of the ſoul. He there affirms, that““ it neither has been, nor can be * proved, that the ſoul is a diſtinct ſubſtance united to the „* dbody:“ That to“ ſuppoſe the ſoul may preſerve a faculty *« of thinking when the body is deſtroyed, is aſſumed without «¹any evidence from the phænomena; nay againſt a ſtrong *¹preſumption derived from them:“ That“ whilſt we are «« alive, we preſerve the capacity or rather faculty, of think- ¹e ing, as we do of moving, and other faculties plainly corpo- α real. When we are dead, all theſe faculties are dead with ¹« us:“— And, as he thinks,“ it might as reaſonably be ſaid, «« we ſhall walk eternally, as think eternally.“ He ſays,“ the **ꝗword ſoul, in philoſophical conſideration, taken for a diſtinct ³* fubſtance united to the body' may be parallelled with“the ³ε 5rimum mobile, and element of fire, which were names in- * vented to ſignify things which have no exiſtence.“ And adds, that,“this figment of a ſoul, if it be a figment, received * ſtrength from the ſuperſtitious theology of the heathens t.“ He repreſents the hypotheſis of two diſtinct ſubſtances in man as more“ unconceivable and abſurd than that of thoſe who ſay « there is no ſuch thing as material ſubſlance, or a material * world u.“ And yet he ſays,“ That there is material ſub- ¹ ſtance no man can doubt—and that thoſe who doubted it

* Vol. iii. p. 363, 364. 4 Ibid. p. 427.* Ibid. p. 4 „ Ibid. p. 534, 535. ¹Ibid, p. 516, 517, 518, Ibid. p. 5 B 3 e ha