Teil eines Werkes 
Vol. II. (1764)
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12
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12 A Vieuw of tbe DEIsTIcAL Writers. Let. 235.

The other thing farther which hath any appearance of argu- ment is, that if the philoſopher aſſerts, that whatever thinks is a ſimple being, immaterial, indiſſoluble, and therefore immortal. We muſt be reduced, if we receive this hy- **potheſis, to ſuppoſe that other animals beſides have imma- terial or immortal ſouls*. And if it be allowed, that other animals have immaterial ſouls too, I do not ſee what abſurdity follows from it; or why it may not reaſonably be ſuppoſed, that there may be innumerable gradations of im- material beings of very different capacities, and intended for dißerent ends and uſes. But our author urges againſt thoſe who ſuppoſe ſenſitive ſouls in brutes, and a rational ſoul in man, thatthe power of thinking is as neceſſary to perception *otk the ſlighteſt ſenſation, as it is to geometrical reaſoning: and that it manifeſtly implies a contradiction to ſay, that a ¹ſfubſtance capable of thought by its nature in one degree or ¹ inſtance, is by its nature incapable of it in any other vy. But I ſee not the leaſt abſurdity in this, except it be ſaid, that it neceſſarily follows that a ſubſtance capable of thought or ſenſe in the loweſt degree, muſt be eſſentialiy capable of thought or ſenſe in the higheſt degree. I can eaſily conceive that a nature may be ſuppoſed capable of the former, and not of the latter. And muſt not he ſay ſo too, ſince he aſſerts, that brutes think, and yet I believe will hardly affirm that they are capable as well as men of geometrical reaſon- ing? There is no abſurdity in ſuppoſing immaterial ſouls, which have ſenſitive perceptions, and are capable of ſenſitive happineſs, without ever riſing beyond this, or being properly capable of moral agency. And ſuppoſing the brutes to have immaterial ſenſitive ſouls which are not annihilated at death, what becomes of them after death, whether they are made uſe of to animate other bodies, or what is done with them, we cannot tell. Nor is our not being able to aſſign an uſe for them ſo much as a prefumprion that they anſwer no end at all, or that they do not exiſt. There may be a thouſand ways which the Lord of nature may have of diſpoſing of them, which we know nothing of.

It appears from what hath been offered, that there is a real foundation in reaſon for the doctrine of the ſoul's immortality, and that therefore there is no need to reſolve it, as this writer ſeems willing to do, into the pride of the human heart. It is his own obſervation, That men were conſcious ever ſince

* Vol. iii, p. 528. y Ibid. p. 531. * their