Let. 26. Lord BorINGBROKE. 31

concluſions formed by every particular perſon from that nature, and from the works of God concerning duty and moral obliga- tion, are to be certainly depended upon. When therefore he aſſerts, that“the contents of the law of nature are objects of „¹«ſuch a certainty, as the author of nature alone can commu- « nicate*,“ if the deſign be to ſignify, that the judgment every man forms for himſelf by his own reaſon, and upon his own authority, as he expreſſeth it, concerning the law of nature, hath ſuch a divine certainty in it, it is manifeſtly falſe. He confounds the objective certainty of the law as founded in the nature of things, with the certainty of the judgment men form concerning it; which are very different things. However cer- tain the law of nature is in itſelf, men may greatly miſtake and miſapprehend it. And it is certain in fact that they do ſtand in great need of particular inſtruction to enable them to acquire a right knowlege of it. And ſurely a divine inſtruction con- cerning it by perſons extraordinarily ſent and commiſſioned to publiſh a revelation of the will of God to mankind, and who give ſufficient proofs of their divine miſſion, muſt be of the higheſt advantage.

This writer himſelf, though he ſo often extols the abſolute clearneſs, certainty, and perfection of the law of nature, 2. e. of the judgment men form by reaſon concerning it; yet at other times makes acknowlegements which quite deſtroy the argument he would draw from it againſt the neceſſity or uſeful- neſs of extraordinary revelation: He had affirmed in a paſſage cited above, that“ natural revélation, for ſo, ſays he, I will call *«it, produces a ſeries of intuitive knowlege from the firſt prin- ¹«ciples to the laſt concluſions.“ Where he ſeems to make both the great principles of the law of nature, and the concluſions that are drawn from it, to be infallibly certain. And yet he elſewhere declares, that the laws of nature are general, and intimates that a multitude of falſe deductions, and wrong ap- plications have been often made of that law. Among ſeveral paſſages to this purpoſe there is one that deſerves particular notice. After having ſaid, that“‧it is in vain to attempt to «* know any thing more than God has ſhewed us in the actual *⁴ conſtitution of thi;“ he adds,“that even when we *judge of them thus, and make particular applications of the ** general laws of nature, we are very liable to miſtakes.— *That there are things fit and unfit, right and wrong, jult ¹*Fand unjuſt in the human ſyſtem, and diſcernible by human

* Vol v. p. 23. f Ibid. p. 145. ** reaſon,