Let. 25. Lord BoLINGBRORKL. 3

*⁴ ſpect to the preſent unequal diſtributions of good and evil." This ſeems unneceſſary to him, becauſe he looks upon the ac- cuſation to be voĩd of any foundation. But the other purpoſe, he ſays, was no doubt very unneceſſary, ſice the belief of fu- *«*ture rewards and puniſhments could not fail to have ſome e effect on ihe manners of men, to encourage virtue, and to «« reſtrain vice.“ Accordingly he calls it“a doctrine uſeful to all religions, and incorporated into all the ſyſtems of Pa- ¹« ganiſm e.“ And he ſays,„the heathen legiſlators might have reaſon to add the terrors of another life to that of ««the judgments of God, and the laws of men ſ.“

And as he owns, that this doctrine is very uſeful to man- kind, ſo he does not pretend poſitively to deny the truth of it. He introduces a plain man of common ſound ſenſe declaring his ſentiments upon this ſubject, and that though he could not affirm, he would not deny the immortality of the ſoul; and that there was nothing to tempt him to deny it; ſince whatever other worlds there may be, the ſame God ſtill governs; and that he has no more to fear from him in one world than in another: That, like the auditor in Tully's firſt Tuſeulan diſpu- tation, he is pleaſed with the proſpect of immortality 8. Again, he obſerves, that“ reaſon will neither affirm nor deny that ¹Fthere is a future ſtate: And that the doctrine of rewards ¹«c and puniſhments in it has ſo great a tendency to inforce the «« civil laws and to reſtrain the vices of men, that reaſon, **c which cannot decide for it on principles of natural theology, will not decide againſt it on principles of good policx. Let « this doctrine reſt on the authority of revelation. A theiſt, « who does not believe the revelation, can have no averſion «⅛c to the doctrineb.“ After having mentioned the ſcheme of a future ſtate propoſed in the analog y of reaſen and revelation, part r. chap. I. he ſays, This hypotheſis may be received;

and that it does not ſo much as imply any thing repugnant **to the perfections of the divine nature.“ He adds,*Ire- «« ceive with joy the expectations it raiſes in my mind.— And «*the antient and modern Epicureans provoke my indignation, when they boaſt as a mighty acquiſition their pretended cer- *«c tainty that the body and the ſoul die together. If they had this certainty, could this diſcovery be ſo very comfortable? — ſhould have no difficulty which to chuſe, if the option was propoſed to me to exiſt after death, or to die whole i.“

*²ĩ Vol. v. p. 238. f Ibid. p, 488. g Vol. iii. p. 558, 559. h Vol. v. 3 22. 489. 1 Vol. v- p. 491, 492.— See alſo Ibid. p. 506, 507.

B 2 If

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