p. 428, 429.

420 A View of tbe DEisTIcAL Writers. Let. 24.

tures, conditions, and circumſtances: nor can the multi plicity of things occaſion the leaſt confuſion or perplexity in his all- comprebiending mind. The argnments which he urgeth againſt a particular provi- dence, in the fifty-ſeventh of his Fragments and Eſſays, for ſeveral pages together', proceed upon a continued mifrepre- ſentation of the ſenſe of thoſe whom he has thought ſit to oppoſe. He there chargeth the divines as maintaining, that God ought by particular providences to interpoſe in every fingle inſtance, for giving an immediate reward to every good action, and for puniſhing every evil one, even in this preſent ſtate. He ſup- poſes them alſo to hold that ſome men are neceſſarily determined to good actions by divine influences communicated to them, and others for want of thoſe influences unavoidably determined to evil. And then he argues, that on ſuch a ſappoſition there would be no room for free choice, nor conſequently for virtue or vice, merit or demerit, nor therefore for juſtice or injuſtice⸗. He urgeth further, that if good men were conſtantly and re- markably diſtinguiſhed by a particular providence, it would be apt to produce preſumption in them, to deſtroy or prevent their benevolence, and conſequently their goodneſs; and to harden the wickeda. And that even on that ſuppoſition, the provi- dence of God could not be vindicated in the opinion of man- kind, or of divines themſelves, ſince ſtill it would not be agreed who were good men. The Mahometans, Chriſtians, and dit- ferent ſects of the latter, would inſiſt upon it, that goodneſs in- cludes a belief of their diſtinguiſhing tenets, and an attachment to their ſeveral ſyſtems of religion. ‧One would paſs for a good * man at Nome, another at Geneva,“&c. b. But he ſeems not to have conſidered, that upon the ſuppoſition he puts, there could be no place for this objection: ſince if every good man and good action was to be immediately and remarkably diſtin- guiſhed by a particular interpoſition of divine providence, and every bad man and evil action to be immediately puniſhed, there would be no room left for men's paſſing different judgments concerning the goodneſs or badneſs of perſons or actions; for on that ſuppoſition, there would be a viſible determination of heaven in favour of every good man and good action; ſo that no man could doubt, upon ſeeing any perſon thus remarkably favoured and diltinguiſhed, that he was really good, whateve; denomination he might paſs under. But the truth is, no divico 7 Vol. v. p 424,& ſeq. 2 Ibid. p. 425, 425. a Ib d. b Ibid. p. 431, 432-