L et. 24. Lord BoLINGBRORKE. 413
goodneſs, and for the joint exerciſe and diſplay of his glorious attributes and perfections, muſt equally diſpoſe him to take care of it, and govern it, when made. Accordingly the Epicureans and others who denied a providence, did alſo deny that the world was made by God, and attributed the formation of it, not to the wiſdom, the power, and will of an intelligent cauſe, but to a wild chance, or fortuitous concourſe of atoms, or to an equally blind fatal neceſſity. And ſo far their ſcheme, how- ever falſe and abſurd, was conſiſtent with itſelf. For they could find no effectual way to exclude God from the government of the world, which was what they wanted to get rid of, but by excluding him from the making of it too. Suppoſing one ſu- preme abſolutely perfect Cauſe and Author of all things, who made this vaſt univerſe, and all the orders of beings in it, which is what Lord Bolingbroke not only allows, but expreſly aſſerts, it follows by the moſt evident conſequence, that the ſame infi- nite power, wiſdom, and goodneſs, which gave exiſtence to the world and all things in it, ſtill preſideth over the univerſal frame in all its parts. The beautiful and conſtant order which is ſtill maintained in the inanimate material ſyſtem, plainly ſheweth that this ſtupendous frame of nature, confiſting of ſuch an in- conceivable variety of parts, is under the conſtant ſuperinten- dency of a moſt wiſe and powerful preſiding Mind, ever preſent to his own work. But the providence of God is eſpecially to be conſidered as exerciſed towards reaſonable creatures, moral agents, which are undoubtedly the nobleſt and moſt excellent of his creatures. The material ſyſtem, whatever order or beauty appeareth in it, is not itſelf conſcious of that beauty and or- der. Nor are mere ſenſitive beings capable of making proper reflections upon it, or of admiring, adoring, obeying the great Parent of the univerſe. This is the ſole privilege of rational intelligent beings. If therefore the providence of God extendeth to any of his creatures at all, we may be ſure that he exerciſeth a ſpecial care over his reaſonable creatures. And ſince he hath given them ſuch noble faculties and moral powers, will govern them in a way ſuitable to thoſe faculties and powers. And this certainly is the moſt admirable part of the divine adminiſtra- tions in the government of the univerſe. For to govern num- berleſs myriads of active intelligent beings, in their ſeveral or- ders and degrees, each of whom have a will and choice of their own, and a power of determining their own actions, to exer- ciſe a conſtant ſuperintendency over them, and to order the events relating to them, and to diſpenſe to them proper retri- butions, not only according to their outward actions, but the
in ward
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